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together in such wise as best suited his fancy. Nevertheless, his experience has been fruitful and long, and it is from such observations as his that history will afterwards be written.

ART. IV. — *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence, and the Methods of Scientific Investigation.* By JOHN STUART MILL. Third Edition. London: John W. Parker. 1851 2 vols. 8vo.

WE should not again call the attention of our readers to a work now so well known and highly esteemed as Mr. J. S. Mill's System of Logic, if, in this third edition of it, he had not "thought it useful to reply with some degree of minuteness to several of the arguments which have been urged against" some of his doctrines and reasonings. He says, very courteously, that he has done so "not from any taste for controversy," but because he wishes to place more clearly and completely before the reader those of his conclusions which have been questioned or denied, together with the grounds on which they rest. He does not complain of the criticisms to which his work has been subjected, but admits that they have been useful to him, by showing where his exposition of a doctrine needed to be amended, or his argument to be strengthened. Among the strictures which he has thus honored with special notice are some which we have repeatedly made, in the pages of this journal and elsewhere, upon his theory of causation; and among the doctrines which he has now for the first time minutely examined and endeavored to confute is that particular theory of causation which we have ventured to advocate, in opposition to the one which Mr. Mill has espoused, and, with great ability, explained and defended. To this formal reply we shall now offer a rejoinder, as we should have done at an earlier day, if we had known that such a reply had been published. But the third edition of his work has not appeared in an American reprint, and as

but few of the English copies have reached this country, we did not learn till very recently that it contained any notice of our observations.

In respect to the theory of causation, Mr. Mill is a disciple of Hume and Dr. Brown, whom he follows about as closely as we have followed Dr. Clarke, Dr. Reid, M. Maine de Biran, and Dugald Stewart, in defending the opposite doctrine. There is no claim to originality of doctrine on either side, however novel and forcible may be the arguments with which old theories are supported. We cannot, therefore, understand the force or the pertinency of the first paragraph which Mr. Mill devotes to this subject.

"It is proper in this place to advert to a doctrine *at least as old as Dr. Reid*, though propounded by him not as certain, but as probable; which has been revived during the last few years in several quarters, and at present gives more signs of life than any other theory of causation at variance with that set forth in the preceding pages." — Vol. I. p. 360.

The doctrine is certainly a great deal older than Dr. Reid; for the larger portion of it is the foundation of the philosophy of Malebranche, and Dr. Clarke gives a very perspicuous and elegant statement of it in a remarkable passage which is cited by Dugald Stewart in his Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers (Book III. Chap. 2). The language of Reid, moreover, seems to us to convey full and absolute conviction of its truth; we cannot find any passage in his writings which implies hesitancy or doubt upon this subject. The following expressions, for instance, taken from his correspondence with Dr. Gregory, towards the close of his life, are very decided and explicit.

"I am not able to form any distinct conception of active power but such as I find in myself. I can only exert my active power by will, which supposes thought. It seems to me, that, if I was not conscious of activity in myself, I could never, from things I see about me, have had the conception or idea of active power."

"In the strict and proper sense, I take an efficient cause to be a being who had power to produce the effect, and exerted the power for that purpose."

"I am not able to form a conception how power, in the strict sense, can be exerted without will; nor can there be will without some degree of understanding. Therefore, nothing can be an efficient cause, in the proper sense, but an intelligent being."

"Matter cannot be the cause of any thing; it can only be an instrument in the hands of a real cause." — Hamilton's *ed. of Dr. Reid's Works*, pp. 59, 65, 66.

Surely, this is not the way in which Dr. Reid was wont to express an opinion that he regarded, "not as certain, but as probable."

Again, we cannot see why Mr. Mill should speak of this theory as one "which has *been revived during the last few years* in several quarters." That doctrine stood in no need of a *revival* which was taught in the Scotch universities without intermission, after Dr. Reid's day, by Dugald Stewart, for more than a third of a century, and was published by him in works that have been, perhaps, more generally read than any other philosophical writings of the present century. A clear and elegant statement of it may be found in Stewart's Outlines of Moral Philosophy, first published in 1793, and in his Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers, which did not appear till 1828. The writings of M. de Biran, Cousin, and Jouffroy have also rendered the theory in question a very familiar one in the several schools of French philosophy, down to the present day.

Leaving these preliminary matters, let us come to Mr. Mill's own theory of causation, which coincides in every important respect with that of Hume and Dr. Brown. He resolves the idea of causation into that of invariable antecedence, and therefore rejects and ignores the idea of *power* altogether. *Efficient* causes, as they are denominated by the Scotch metaphysicians, find no place in his philosophy. It is admitted on all hands, — no less by such truly pious men as Dr. Barrow, Dean Berkeley, Dr. Butler, and Dr. Price, than by skeptics like Hume, and religious metaphysicians like Reid and Stewart, — that in regard to merely physical events, or in the *material* universe alone, we are never able *to discern or perceive* any thing more than the *invariable conjunction* of two phenomena. If the phenomenon A happens, the phe-

nomenon B invariably succeeds; this fact is made known by constant and universal experience, and this is all. But the connection between two such phenomena is not, and never can be, known *a priori*, or through such acquaintance with the internal character or essence of A, as would enable us to predict that it would be followed by B as its necessary effect, even if we had never seen the experiment or heard of its being made. Yet not one of these writers, except the sceptic Hume, will admit, that, because we cannot directly perceive or know A to be the efficient cause of B, therefore B takes place or happens without *any* efficient cause; still less would they admit that we do not know what an *efficient cause* is, or that these two words present no definite meaning to our minds. Mr. Mill, however, if we rightly understand him, here agrees with Hume; he denies any such necessary connection between cause and effect as implies an operating principle in the cause. "*There is nothing*," he says, — not merely that 'we can discern or perceive nothing,' — but "there is nothing in causation but invariable, certain, and unconditional sequence." Again he says, speaking of the reluctance with which mankind accept such a theory, "*even if the reason repudiates*, imagination retains, the feeling of some more intimate connection, of some peculiar tie, or mysterious constraint exercised by the antecedent over the consequent." Mr. Mill evidently thinks that "the reason" *does* "repudiate" the idea of such connection, — or, in other words, the idea of *power;* and therefore he repudiates it also. The distinction commonly made between something which acts, and something which is acted upon, is "merely verbal," he says; there being no real action in the case, either term in the sequence has just as good a right to be called the *agent* as the other. "*All* the *positive* conditions of a phenomenon are alike agents, alike active."

In strict conformity with this doctrine, Mr. Mill maintains that no proper distinction can be made between what is popularly called the *cause* of a phenomenon, and its other *conditions.*

"It is seldom, if ever, between a consequent and a single antecedent, that this invariable sequence subsists. It is usually between a

consequent and the sum of several antecedents; the concurrence of all of them being requisite to produce, that is, to be certain of being followed by, the consequent. In such cases it is very common to single out one only of the antecedents under the denomination of Cause, calling the others merely Conditions. Thus, if a person eats of a particular dish, and dies in consequence, that is, would not have died if he had not eaten of it, people would be apt to say that eating of that dish was the cause of his death. There needs not, however, be any invariable connection between eating of the dish and death; but there certainly is, among the circumstances which took place, some combination or other on which death is invariably consequent: as, for instance, the act of eating of the dish, combined with a particular bodily constitution, a particular state of present health, and perhaps even a certain state of the atmosphere; the whole of which circumstances perhaps constituted in this particular case the *conditions* of the phenomenon, or, in other words, the set of antecedents which determined it, and but for which it would not have happened. *The real Cause is the whole of these antecedents; and we have, philosophically speaking, no right to give the name of Cause to one of them, exclusively of the others.*" — Vol. I. pp. 339, 340.

He proceeds to analyze several instances of what is usually termed *causation*, and founds on such analysis his assertion that "*each and every condition* of the phenomenon may be taken in its turn, and (with equal propriety in common parlance, but with equal impropriety in scientific discourse) may be spoken of as if it were *the entire cause*." It is "an illusion" which disposes us to regard the proximate event as more peculiarly or efficiently *the cause* than any of the antecedent states. He denies that any one of the conditions of a phenomenon can be singled out and denominated its exclusive cause, because he denies that any cause (so called) ever exerts *force* or *power*, that would always *tend* to produce the phenomenon which, under given circumstances, or given conditions, it actually does produce. If A shoots B dead, still we cannot properly say that A was the *cause* of B's death, any more than that the pulling of the trigger, or the contact of the spark with the gunpowder, or the passage of the bullet through the body, or the effusion of blood, was the *cause* of the death. No one of these antecedents was the cause more than any other, simply because *there was no cause*

— no application of *force* — no exertion of *power*. There has only been a "conjunction of events," such as always will happen, indeed, if precisely the same antecedent circumstances happen, but which is not truly caused by any thing.

Having thus completely eliminated the idea, as well as the reality, of any active *force* or *power* in causation, Mr. Mill thinks he has thereby effectually exorcised the bugbear of Fatalism, which has so long obstructed the reception of the doctrine of Necessity. He avows that he is a Necessarian, but he stoutly denies that he is a Fatalist. Men are unwilling to admit, he says, that there is any "peculiar tie" between a man's previously formed character together with his motives on the one hand and his actions on the other, so that the latter are under "a mysterious constraint" from the former. No; a man's motives do not *compel* or *force* his character. There is no *compulsion* in the case; there is no such thing as *force*. If there were, Fatalism would be the only true doctrine. But a man's actions are "the invariable, certain, and unconditional" results or consequents of his motives and his character. The actions *must* have been what they are, and *must* be repeated, if the same antecedents should again occur; the man could not have willed otherwise than he did; and under the same circumstances, the same volition would inevitably be repeated. B invariably follows A, and always *must* follow it; yet, so long as A does not compel B to follow it, but the inevitableness of the sequence arises from some other source, — say, from the nature of things or from a logical necessity, — then the doctrine is not one of Fatalism, but only of Necessity.

Mr. Mill finds great comfort in this distinction; but we must avow our opinion, that it is a distinction without a difference. We do not object to the Fatalist's doctrine so much on account of what he asserts, as on account of what he denies. He asserts that the strongest motive constrains the will with a despotic power, so that the volition could not have been otherwise than what it was. This is bad enough, and even Mr. Mill does not agree with him, but affirms that the motive does *not* constrain the will, because no one thing ever constrains or causes another thing. There is no such thing as

"a peculiar tie or mysterious constraint" in any case. But the Fatalist denies that *we* are the free causes of our own actions; and here, unfortunately, Mr. Mill agrees with him, and for the same reason as that alleged in the former instance, namely, that there is no such thing as efficient causation. If this be so, we are just as badly off as ever; for remorse is illusory, and repentance is vain, if the action repented of was the "invariable, certain, and unconditional" consequence of what preceded it, so that it could not have been changed by any exertion of the will alone, unaided by a change of circumstances.

Conscious, however, that man needs a little consolation under the fearful doctrine that all his volitions and actions are the inevitable consequents of circumstances over which he has no control, Mr. Mill tries to administer a drop of comfort by suggesting, that, if a person *wishes* to alter his character, (that character being *one* of the antecedents which his volitions follow,) then the *wish* itself is a new antecedent, "and by no means one of the least influential," and it necessarily tends towards its own fulfilment. In other words, if the wish exists to modify the character, the character really *is* somewhat modified by that wish. But then, this wish "is given us, not by any efforts of ours, but by circumstances which we cannot help; it comes to us either from external causes, or not at all." "Most true," responds our author; yet if circumstances have not given us any desire about the matter, then we have no reason to be troubled. If we have not the wish, we cannot complain of its non-fulfilment. In this case, we are dumb cattle, driven forward by an inexorable master, Fate; but luckily we are *blind* cattle, and do not therefore lament our destiny, because we are ignorant that the path along which we are driven terminates on a precipice.

We cannot find much comfort in this suggestion. In no proper sense are we masters of our own destiny, if the mastership is given or withheld only by some circumstance over which we have no control; and it is a very imperfect mastership at best, as the existence of the wish is only *one* out of the many antecedents, independent of our own will, which determine our whole conduct. A faint wish would have

little or no effect. "If what we do depends on our wishing to do it," says Dr. Walker, "and our wishing to do it depends not on ourselves, then nothing depends on ourselves, except to be the willing and active instruments of destiny." The most decided Fatalist will readily admit, that the thoughts and wishes which come into our minds without any agency on our part, and whether we will or not, are *among* the circumstances which regulate our actions and shape our destiny.

In all other respects, save the two qualifying doctrines (if they can be called such) which we have now fully considered, Mr. Mill is a consistent and rigorous Fatalist. He is too good a logician to stop short of any legitimate inferences from his doctrine, and too bold and independent a thinker to shrink from avowing these inferences, whatever they may be.

"There is no Thing produced, no event happening, in the known universe, which is not connected by a uniformity, or invariable sequence, with some one or more of the phenomena which preceded it; insomuch that it will happen again as often as those phenomena occur again, and as no other phenomenon having the character of a counteracting cause shall coexist. These antecedent phenomena, again, were connected in a similar manner with some that preceded them; and so on, until we reach, as the ultimate step attainable by us, either the properties of some one primeval cause, or the conjunction of several. The whole of the phenomena of nature were therefore the necessary, or, in other words, the unconditional, consequences of some former collocation of the Permanent Causes.

"The state of the whole universe at any instant we believe to be the consequence of its state at the previous instant; insomuch that one who knew all the agents which exist at the present moment, their collocation in space, and their properties, — in other words, the laws of their agency, — could predict the whole subsequent history of the universe, at least unless some new volition of a power capable of controlling the universe should supervene." — Vol. I. pp. 357, 358.

The character of this doctrine cannot be mistaken; Spinoza or Fichte did not announce a more comprehensive and consistent theory of Fatalism. It teaches us that every event is surrounded by other events, and must be considered as being at the same time both antecedent and consequent, — as *neces-*

sarily resulting from those which preceded, and *necessarily* followed by those which come after it, and thus as forming one link in an adamantine chain which extends from eternity to eternity. All occurrences whatever have their environment of circumstances, with which they stand in necessary and fixed relations by an absolute law; and the state of the universe at any one moment, in all its parts, from the creation of a world to the stirring of an aspen-leaf, could not possibly have been different from what it is. The presence and the apparent activity of human beings cannot affect or modify this inevitable result. Man himself is but one link in the chain, and is as much bound by the relentless law of destiny as the dust that he treads upon. He cannot move a finger, he cannot have a sensation, he cannot entertain a single thought, except in the manner and at the moment prescribed by that iron law which determines the position of every grain of sand in the desert, and regulates the movement of every atom of dust that floats in the atmosphere. In every such atom, indeed, man beholds the complete type of his own destiny. As the gyrations and seemingly irregular and lawless movements of that atom actually result from the fixed laws of gravitation and inertia, combined with the equally stable laws which govern the immense variety of meteorological phenomena, and could be exactly predicted if all these laws were known, and all the data could be collected, — so the conduct of man, even in the slightest particulars, could be exactly foreseen, if all the antecedent and concomitant circumstances, which inevitably determine his conduct, could be gathered and accurately measured. There is a Science of Human Nature, according to Mr. Mill, just as there is a Science of Meteorological Phenomena; though, both in one case and the other, the circumstances or data are so numerous and diversified, that we cannot hope, with our imperfect means of observation, to gather them all and weigh them accurately, so as to predict infallibly just what the weather will be every day for the next year, or just what the man will do every hour and every minute of his future life.

Having taken this summary view of Mr. Mill's doctrine, we are now prepared to contrast it with the opposite theory of

causation which has been repeatedly presented and advocated in this journal, and which he has now undertaken to confute. We are willing to accept his own sketch of the chief points of this theory, and of some of the considerations adduced in its support. The following, then, is his outline of what he calls the Volition Theory.

"According to the theory in question, Mind, or, to speak more precisely, Will, is the only cause of phenomena. The type of Causation, as well as the exclusive source from which we derive the idea, is our own voluntary agency. Here, and here only (it is said), we have direct evidence of causation. We know that we can move our bodies. Respecting the phenomena of inanimate nature, we have no other direct knowledge than that of antecedence and sequence. But in the case of our voluntary actions, it is affirmed that we are conscious of power before we have experience of results. An act of volition, whether followed by an effect or not, is accompanied by a consciousness of effort, 'of force exerted, of power in action, which is necessarily causal, or causative.'* This feeling of energy or force, inherent in an act of will, is knowledge *a priori;* assurance, prior to experience, that we have the power of causing effects. Volition, therefore, it is asserted, is something more than an unconditional antecedent; it is a cause in a different sense from that in which physical phenomena are said to cause one another: it is an Efficient Cause. From this the transition is easy to the further doctrine, that Volition is the *sole* Efficient Cause of all phenomena. 'It is inconceivable that dead force could continue unsupported for a moment beyond its creation. We cannot even conceive of change or phenomena without the energy of a mind.' 'The word *action* itself,' says another writer of the same school, 'has no real significance, except when applied to the doings of an intelligent agent. Let any one conceive, if he can, of any power, energy, or force, inherent in a lump of matter.'† Phenomena may have the semblance of being produced by physical causes, but they are in reality produced, say these writers, by the immediate agency of mind. All things which do not proceed from a human (or, I suppose, an animal) will, proceed, they say, directly from Divine will. The earth is not moved by the combination of a centripetal and a projectile force; this is but a mode of speaking which serves to facilitate our conceptions. It is moved by the direct

* *N. A. Review*, for April, 1845, p. 470. *Lowell Lectures on the Application of Metaphysical and Ethical Science to the Evidences of Religion*, p. 84.

† *Lowell Lectures, &c.*, p. 88.

volition of an omnipotent being, in a path coinciding with that which we deduce from the hypothesis of these two forces." — Vol. I. pp. 360, 361.

We cannot find much novelty in the objection which Mr. Mill proceeds to make to this theory. He repeats the old, unfounded statement, that our voluntary acts differ in no essential respect from those material phenomena which are usually cited as instances of causation, though it is now universally admitted the causal *nexus* cannot be detected in them, but that they seem to be related to each other only as antecedents and consequents. "Our will," he affirms, "causes our bodily actions in the same sense, and in no other, in which cold causes ice, or a spark causes the explosion of gunpowder." The volition is the antecedent, the actual motion is the consequent; but the connection between them, it is said, is not a subject of consciousness, but only of experience. It is allowed that both the antecedent and the consequent are subjects of consciousness, but it is denied that we are conscious of the dependence of one of them upon the other.

Surely a marked difference is established between the two classes of cases by this very fact, that the antecedent in one of them being a state of mind, we know it intimately and immediately, consciousness attesting its relation to the effect *before* the effect follows; while in any succession of events, exterior to our bodies, we must wait for the result of the experiment before we can know whether the antecedent will be followed by one consequent or another. We must wait till the trial is made, before we can say that a spark, if it falls into a basin of water, will be extinguished, or, if it falls upon a heap of gunpowder, will cause an explosion. But if I will to move my arm, before the result of the attempt is made known, before I can learn whether my arm is paralyzed or not, I know that the mental effort is directed to my arm, and not to my leg, — that it is intended even to produce a particular movement of the arm, as upwards, or downwards, or sideways. If any result follows, I know just what the character of the result will be. But in the case of the spark falling upon gunpowder, upon sand, or upon water, we know not what kind of result will follow, or whether there will be any result.

But after making, in the text, the uncompromising assertion

that those against whom he is contending "have never produced, and do not pretend to produce, any positive evidence that the power of our will to move our bodies would be known to us independently of experience," Mr. Mill adds the following admission in a note.

"Unless we are to consider as such the following statement, by one of the writers quoted in the text: 'In the case of mental exertion, the result to be accomplished is *preconsidered* or meditated, and is therefore known *a priori*, or before experience.' — (Bowen's *Lowell Lectures on the Application of Metaphysical and Ethical Science to the Evidences of Religion*, Boston, 1849.) This is merely saying, that when we will a thing, we have an idea of it. But to have an idea of what we wish to happen, does not imply a prophetic knowledge that it will happen." — Vol. I. p. 362.

Certainly it does not; but a *mental* sequence, between a volition and a bodily motion, is hereby distinguished from a sequence between two external events, because, in the latter case, the antecedent gives us no idea at all *what* the consequent will be, and no assurance that there will be *any* consequent; while in the former case, the antecedent does inform us, through consciousness, and prior to experience, *what* the consequent will be, if any, and also that it will *tend* to produce this particular consequent, even if the effort, or the force of the volition, should not suffice to produce the whole of the intended result; — just as I may be conscious that I push against a pane of glass, though I do not push hard enough to break it. It is something to establish this distinction between a mental and an external sequence, because we thereby negative Mr. Mill's previous assertion, that "our will causes our bodily actions *in the same sense, and in no other*, in which cold causes ice." The king of Siam knew what cold is, for even in his climate the nights are cooler than the days; but he did not know that cold would change water into a solid, and he would not believe it. But if his Siamese Majesty had willed to move his arm, though, from sudden paralysis, the movement should not follow, he would still know that his volition had reference to his arm, and not to any other portion of his body, and also that the volition *tended* to produce the required motion, though his strength was suddenly found insufficient to effect it entirely.

Again, — though "the idea of what we *wish* to happen" does not imply a prophetic knowledge of what will happen, yet the idea of what we *will* (i. e. the consciousness of a volition) does imply, if not a *prophetic* knowledge of what *will* happen, yet an *immediate* knowledge of something that *does* happen. It is a consciousness of an action — of something *done* — of power exerted — whether the future result of that action be precisely what we intended or not. An act of the will is at the same moment a volition and an action; it is but one state of mind considered under two different relations. It is a volition, in so far as it is directed to one purpose or another; it is an action, in so far as it is something done, (and something therefore for which our conscience holds us responsible,) whether the ulterior purpose in view is answered or not. Mr. Mill's ingenious periphrasis for a volition — "an *idea* of what we *wish* to happen" — cannot be accepted. Merely "to have an idea" of a thing, is not *to do* that thing. I may "have an idea" of committing murder; but I do not thereby commit murder. The mind is entirely passive when it is occupied with mere contemplation, or is merely entertaining ideas. But on the other hand, if I *will* to commit murder, and, as a necessary means to this end, *will* to pull the trigger of a pistol, then, *in foro conscientiæ*, I am guilty of that murder, *because I have done something*, though, from the rustiness of the lock, the trigger should not move, and the life of the intended victim should thereby be saved.

Mr. Mill argues that our consciousness of the volition does not contain in itself any *a priori* knowledge that the muscular motion will follow, because the nerves may be paralyzed, or the muscles stiff, and then, in fact, the motion will not follow. The paralysis of the nerves, in this case, answers exactly to the rustiness of the lock of the pistol. Though the *whole* effect which was intended does not follow, a portion of it is certainly accomplished, because *something* is done, and that something tends towards, or is a part of, the effect originally intended. Something is done, because force was expended — power was exercised. We have proof of this in "the consciousness of effort," the existence of which Mr. Mill does not deny. *Effort* means power exerted. We have

already said, in a passage which is cited by Mr. Mill, that "force exerted, or power in action, *is necessarily causal or causative.*" It is an *efficient* cause. It may not be *sufficient* for the end proposed, as in the case of the pistol lock, or the paralyzed arm. But that force exerted should not produce *any* effect, amounts very nearly to a contradiction in terms; for our only idea of force is that which produces something. Mr. Mill is not able to deny this, for in another portion of his work, in a passage which we cited from him, he has unwarily admitted the fact. When speaking of the laws of motion, he says: —

"The body does not only move in that direction unless counteracted; it *tends* to move in that manner even when counteracted; it still exerts, in the original direction, the same energy of movement as if its first impulse had been undisturbed, and produces, by that energy, an exactly equivalent quantity of effect. This is true even when the force leaves the body as it found it, in a state of absolute rest; as when we attempt to raise a body of three tons' weight with a force equal to one ton." — Vol. I. p. 454.

And again: —

"These facts are correctly indicated by the expression *tendency.* All laws of causation, in consequence of their liability to be counteracted, require to be stated in words affirmative of tendencies only, and not of actual results. Thus *pressure*, in mechanics, is synonymous with tendency to motion, and forces are not reckoned as causing actual motion, but as exerting pressure." — Vol. I. p. 455.

And yet, in the single instance of a volition to produce a bodily motion, Mr. Mill refuses to admit that the volition *tends* to produce the motion, because, if the limb be paralyzed, the motion does not follow; though he allows that there is a "consciousness of effort," or, in other words, of power exerted.

We are now prepared to consider another portion of Mr. Mill's note on our remark, that, "in the case of mental exertion, the result to be accomplished is *preconsidered* or meditated."

"After all, even if we had an instinctive knowledge that our actions would follow our will, this, as Brown remarks, would prove nothing as to the nature of Causation. Our knowing, previous to experience,

that an antecedent will be followed by a certain consequent, would not prove the relation between them to be any thing *more* than antecedence and consequence." — Vol. I. p. 363.

If, as in the case of two events in the external world, our only reason for believing one of them to be the cause of the other were the fact, that it is invariably followed by the other, then certainly this fact, whether known *a priori* or only by experience, would not prove efficient causation — would not make manifest the causal *nexus* between them. If a man of science, in whose word I have full confidence, assures me that water poured upon quicklime will produce heat, I may believe him, and thus be enabled to predict the result of the experiment before I have tried it. But the experiment itself, or the assurance of another, only communicates the barren fact of the invariable sequence of the two events. The case is far different, however, when it is my knowledge of the internal constitution, or *essence*, of the antecedent event which enables me to predict that it *must* be followed by the consequent. In the case of a volition, *I* am the cause, and my knowledge of my own acts, acquired through consciousness, assures me that in the volition I have exerted *force*, and this expenditure of power *must* be followed at least by *some* effect. The fact that the result is preconsidered, or known beforehand, is not important in itself, but only as one indication or proof, among others, that we are aware of the *causative* character of the volition before it is manifested by any effect. In the case of external events, we are always obliged to wait till the effect follows, before obtaining an indication that there is to be any effect whatever.

Mr. Mill asserts that it is only because the succession of the muscular movement to the volition is the most direct, instantaneous, and familiar of all sequences which come under our observation, that we are prone to consider it as less mysterious than any succession of material phenomena. He says it is only the common case of attempting to facilitate our conception of unfamiliar facts by assimilating them to others which are familiar. Yet he admits that there was a time when the action of matter upon matter was held to be both more familiar and more susceptible of explanation — more easily con-

ceivable — than the action of mind upon matter. The world is still divided upon the question which of the two operations is the more explicable. But this difference of opinion is easily accounted for. To the students of physical science, accustomed to the processes of the laboratory and the workshop, the succession of material phenomena is the more familiar, so that it seems not to stand in need of any explanation. Savages and half-civilized nations, for a similar reason, are still more prone to look upon the subject in this light. Metaphysicians alone are more familiar with the facts attested by consciousness. If, therefore, as Mr. Mill asserts, "in the infancy and early youth of the human race," our voluntary acts are "spontaneously taken as the type of causation in general, and all phenomena are supposed to be directly produced by the will of some sentient being," then the more frequently observed phenomena are referred for explanation to those which are less familiarly known; and this can only be because they have a direct consciousness of the exertion of power in the latter case, while mere body, familiar as it is, appears to them essentially inert. Yet our author calls this doctrine "original Fetichism"; and, with a nearer approach to a sneer than is becoming in a philosopher, says, he "will not characterize it in the words of Hume, or of any follower of Hume, but in those of a religious metaphysician, Dr. Reid, in order more effectually to show the unanimity which exists on the subject among all competent thinkers."

He proceeds to cite from Reid a passage in which that philosopher remarks upon the proneness of children and rude nations to ascribe life and active power to material objects, and to stock fountains, rivers, and trees with their attendant deities, because they cannot believe such objects to have power to move themselves. The citation is a most unlucky one for Mr. Mill's purpose, as he would have perceived, if he had read only two paragraphs farther. The passage quoted by him ends with the following remarks.

"When a few, of superior intellectual abilities, find leisure for speculation, they begin to philosophize, and soon discover that many of those objects which at first they believed to be intelligent and active are really lifeless and passive. *This is a very important discovery. It elevates*

the mind, emancipates from many vulgar superstitions, and invites to further discoveries of the same kind.

"As philosophy advances, life and activity in natural objects retires, and leaves them dead and inactive. Instead of moving voluntarily, we find them to be moved necessarily; instead of acting, we find them to be acted upon; and Nature appears as one great machine, where one wheel is turned by another, that by a third; and how far this necessary succession may reach, the philosopher does not know." — Vol. I. p. 365.

The lines which we have italicized are, perhaps, indication enough that the Scotch metaphysician is here speaking ironically, and is therefore actually laughing at the doctrine of which our author supposes him to be the advocate. So much for "the unanimity which exists on the subject among all *competent* thinkers"! Reid was a little too apt to boast himself as the special advocate of the common sense of common people against the arrogant pretensions of "the philosophers," as he calls them. Thus, in the second of the foregoing paragraphs, he proceeds to speak, still sarcastically, of the efforts of the speculative few to frame a theory which shall be just the opposite of the vulgar belief, — which shall represent Nature as a great machine, or piece of clockwork, in which motion is necessarily produced by motion, and this again by another motion; "and how far this necessary succession may reach, *the philosopher* does not know." In the next paragraph, not cited by Mr. Mill, he drops the ironical tone, and declares both these extreme opinions to be equally absurd and unfounded; the one is polytheism, and the other is atheism, for it traces back the law of fate even to the actions of Deity, and leaves us without any notions whatever of a free cause or of any power in the universe.

"The weakness of human reason makes men prone, when they leave one extreme, to rush into the opposite; and thus philosophy, even in its infancy, may lead men from idolatry and polytheism into atheism, and from ascribing active power to inanimate beings, to conclude all things to be carried on by necessity." — Reid *on the Active Powers*, Essay IV. Ch. 3.

In future, Mr. Mill will probably consider it hazardous to make citations from any author without carefully examining their context.

"For 'tis the sport, to have the engineer
Hoist with his own petar."

We may pass very quickly over the remainder of his comments on the Volition Theory, as he only reiterates and amplifies, through five or six pages, his unsupported assertion that the advocates of this theory "exalt into an original law of the human intellect and of outward nature one particular sequence of phenomena, which appears to them more natural and more conceivable than other sequences, only because it is more familiar." We answer, first, that the fact is not so, and secondly, if it were so, it would prove nothing for Mr. Mill's argument. To the great bulk of mankind, the most familiar and striking phenomena are *material* phenomena, — things and events in the external world; about these, their thoughts and actions are almost exclusively concerned. And the most obvious explanation of these phenomena is that which infers causation from mere succession, which considers every physical event to be the efficient cause of that which follows it, and the natural effect of that which precedes it. Among common people, ninety-nine out of a hundred believe that the falling of a spark *causes* the explosion of the powder, and that taking poison *causes* death. Nay, so prone are they to infer causation from mere succession, that many of them believe an earthquake or the appearance of a comet to be the true cause of a pestilence, a famine, or any other public calamity which may happen to follow it. Materialism is a far more natural or *vulgar* error, (the last epithet describes what Mr. Mill actually means,) than idealism.

In the second place, even if the assertion were true, it would be nugatory for the purposes of this argument. The more natural and obvious explanation of a phenomenon is just as likely to be the true one as that which is more recondite and far-fetched. Thus, Reid's doctrine of *perception*, as improved by Sir William Hamilton, and now almost universally accepted by "competent thinkers," is only a return to common sense, or a formal adoption by the philosophers of the opinion that has always been entertained by the vulgar, and a rejection of all the cobweb systems and so-called explanations of this subject which metaphysicians have been

spinning for three thousand years. We do not hold, however, that the obviousness of this doctrine is any strong recommendation of it, or that the want of obviousness is any valid objection to the theories which are opposed to it. Every theory in science, and every alleged fact, must rest on its own direct evidence; no weighty presumption for or against either is to be drawn from the mere circumstance that the cognition of them is easy or difficult. The existence of latent heat is now just as certain, and as fully proved, as that of the heat of temperature, though no one before Dr. Black even suspected its existence, and though the fact cannot be demonstrated even now without an array of experiments and reasoning. On the other hand, philosophers, and especially metaphysicians, are generally prone to make a mystery out of a very simple thing, and to speak contemptuously of the verdict of common people when that verdict happens to be against them. Mr. Mill is too sound and competent a thinker to be guilty of this affectation, except when he is hard pushed for an argument.

We pass to our author's final objection to the Volition Theory, or rather to the doctrine of the Immediate Agency of the Deity, which is asserted as a corollary from the Volition Theory. The doctrine is, that *all* the phenomena of the material universe, so far as they show change, diversity, and activity which are not attributable to *human* power and will, manifest the immediate and omnipresent action of the Deity. Dr. Clarke states the doctrine thus: — "All those things which we commonly say are the effects of the natural powers of matter and laws of motion, of gravitation, attraction, or the like, are indeed (if we will speak properly and truly) the effects of God's acting upon matter *continually and every moment*, either immediately by himself, or mediately by some created *intelligent* being." Mr. Mill objects as follows.

"I am unwilling to leave the subject without adverting to the additional fallacy contained in the corollary from this theory; in the inference that, because Volition is an efficient cause, therefore it is the only cause, and the direct agent in producing even what is apparently produced by something else. Volitions are not known to produce any thing directly except nervous action, for the will influences even the

muscles only through the nerves. Though it were granted, then, that every phenomenon has an efficient, and not merely a phenomenal cause, and that volition, in the case of the peculiar phenomena which are known to be produced by it, is that efficient cause: are we therefore to say, with these writers, that since we know of no other efficient cause, and ought not to assume one without evidence, there *is* no other, and volition is the direct cause of all phenomena? A more outrageous stretch of inference could hardly be made. Because among the infinite variety of the phenomena of nature there is one, namely, a particular mode of action of certain nerves, which has for its cause, and as we are now supposing for its efficient cause, a state of our mind; and because this is the only efficient cause of which we are conscious, being the only one of which in the nature of the case we *can* be conscious, since it is the only one which exists within ourselves; does this justify us in concluding that all other phenomena must have the same kind of efficient cause with that one eminently special, narrow, and peculiarly human or animal phenomenon? The supporters of the Volition Theory ask us to infer that volition causes every thing, for no reason except that it causes one particular thing; although that one phenomenon, far from being a type of all natural phenomena, is eminently peculiar; its laws bearing scarcely any resemblance to those of any other phenomenon, whether of inorganic or of organic nature."— Vol. I. pp. 370 – 372.

We presume Mr. Mill will admit, as a sound logical maxim, what Sir William Hamilton calls the Law of Parsimony, — *entiæ non multiplicandæ sunt præter necessitatem*, — no more causes must be assigned than what are absolutely necessary to account for the phenomena. We are now entitled to assume that the Volition Theory is proved, Mr. Mill himself taking it for granted (for the moment) in the preceding extract. The reasoning, then, runs thus: — Numberless changes are constantly taking place in matter, which are to be accounted for, as every phenomenon must have a cause; the material body cannot change itself, for we know that matter is utterly lifeless and inert, incapable of effecting change either in itself or in any thing else; a large class of these changes take place in our own bodies, and are immediately known to be effected by the direct agency of the human will, which is the only agency within our sphere of immediate knowledge that is capable of exerting any sort of power or force; we know, also, (not im-

mediately, indeed, but from abundant evidence,) that another Will exists in nature, which is omnipresent and omnipotent; — when, therefore, we ascribe all the changes in matter which are not produced by ourselves to the omnipresent action of the Divine Mind, we assign them to the only known Cause in the universe which is capable of producing them, and to a Cause perfectly similar in kind (though infinitely disparate in degree) to the human will, which we know to be a source of power, and the efficient cause of a vast number of changes that are effected every moment in our own bodies. Or the argument may be more briefly stated thus: — Volition is the only known *power* in the universe; changes in matter are the phenomena to be accounted for; and as many such changes are confessedly produced by human volition, the residue of them must be attributed to some other Will, which, by its omnipresence and omnipotence, is capable of producing them.

This reasoning may not be satisfactory to Mr. Mill, as it establishes a doctrine which he is unwilling to admit; but we contend that it is eminently logical, and in proof of our assertion we once more cite against him his own System of Logic. The kind of reasoning here employed is what he calls the method of "induction by simple enumeration," — a law being assumed to hold good in all cases, because it has been found to hold good in many cases, and not one instance has been found to the contrary. It is certainly curious to find Mr. Mill, in the following passage, asserting that this process is entirely valid and legitimate in reference to the law of universal causation itself, the very instance to which we are here applying it.*

"Induction by simple enumeration, or, in other words, generalization of an observed fact from the mere absence of any known instance to the contrary, is by no means the illicit logical process in all cases which it is in most. It is delusive and insufficient exactly in proportion as the subject-matter of the observation is special and limited in extent. As the sphere widens, this unscientific method becomes less and less liable

* We are obliged here to quote the *first* edition of Mill's Logic; for in this third edition, the passage is so much modified and enlarged that it is not so well adapted for our purpose. Substantially the same doctrine is still expressed in it; but the author seems to have been half conscious that he was here contradicting himself, and he has labored hard, though in vain, to remove the difficulty.

to mislead; and the most universal class of truths, *the law of causation, for instance*, and the principles of number and of geometry, *are duly and satisfactorily proved by that method alone, nor are they susceptible of any other proof.*" — Book IV. Ch. XXI. § 2.

The case we are now considering is one of *universal* generalization; it embraces *all* the phenomena of the material universe, every change in which requires a cause. Human bodies, of course, are a part of this universe, — as much so as the ground these bodies tread upon, or the air they breathe. All the voluntary movements of these bodies, which are repeated and varied till their number exceeds all calculation, are known to proceed from the will as their efficient cause; and the will is the only known instance of efficient causation in the universe. The law of "induction by simple enumeration," then, is strictly applicable in this case; and the conclusion to which it leads us is, that all other physical events — from the quivering of an aspen-leaf up to the flight of the planets in their courses — are also attributable to *Will*, and *that* Will must be one proportioned in power and comprehensiveness to the variety and grandeur of its effects. That this Will belongs to a Being differing from all those whose existence is made known to us by the testimony of the senses, is not a circumstance which vitiates the argument, for the reasoning is addressed only to the Theist. The muscular movements of different individuals are ascribed respectively to the volitions of those individuals. The will has efficient causative agency *as such*, and not because it is the will of one man or another, — not because it is human or divine.

We have elsewhere stated this reasoning in a more popular form, and will quote the passage: —

"We recognize the presence of God in nature in precisely the same manner in which we come to know that any intelligent, though finite being, exists besides ourselves. The outward form, surely, is nothing; a statue or an automaton may be moulded into a perfect external likeness of a man. But the actions of the living man show that he is animated by a spirit kindred to our own, by something distinct from the mere framework of bones and muscles which he inhabits, and which we distinguish as clearly from the person within as we do our own bodies from ourselves. *I* am conscious of power dependent on my will, and I

perceive the effects produced on matter by the exertion of that will. I perceive, also, perfectly similar effects, which I can attribute only to my brother man, and I infer, therefore, that *he* exists, and that his will is equally active in producing those effects. I do not imagine that his limbs move themselves, but that *he* moves them; I do not think that his eye turns towards me of its own accord with a glance of affection, or that his hand comes to meet mine in a friendly grasp from an energy that is inherent in that hand alone. In like manner, then, I say, if *His* sun rolls over my head and warms me, if His wind cools and refreshes me, if His voice speaks to me, — whether in the thunder at midnight, or in the whispers of the forest, or but in the rustling of a leaf, — if His seasons still come round to me in their grateful vicissitude, and, wherever I look in outward nature, I behold constant action, change, and joy, I do not suppose that brute and senseless matter causes all this by its inherent power, whether original or derived, but that the spirit, the Person, within, controls, vivifies, and produces all.

> 'These, as they change, Almighty Father, these
> Are but the varied God. The rolling year
> Is full of thee.'"

— *Lowell Lectures on the Application of Metaphysical and Ethical Science*, pp. 135, 136.

We had purposed to make some further observations on Mr. Mill's argument against the freedom of the will, and on a few other points in his doctrine of causation as contrasted with the Volition Theory. But this article has already exceeded the limits proper for the discussion of so abstruse a subject, and we forbear. We are willing to allow the brief statement that has been given of the nature and the consequences of his system to stand in juxtaposition and contrast with the opposite theory which he has so vehemently assailed. They are not merely the extremes of opinion on this difficult question; they are, also, the *only* logical and consistent views of it which can be taken, all intermediate doctrines being imperfect and inconsequent. He who rejects either of them cannot consistently stop short of embracing the other to its full extent. Even so acute a philosopher and logician as Mr. Mill has failed, as we have seen, to reconcile his rejection of all free causation in the universe with any doctrine that stops short of the gloomiest extreme of Fatalism. On the other hand, his objections to the theory that volition is the only efficient cause either of

mental or of material phenomena are so feeble, that they tend rather to increase than diminish our confidence in it. The position that has not even been shaken by the assaults of so able an opponent must be in itself impregnable. We have criticized his arguments with freedom, but with no abatement of respect for one who occupies deservedly so high a rank among the English thinkers of the present day.

ART. V. — 1. LOUIS XVII.: *sa Vie, son Agonie, sa Mort; Captivité de la Famille Royale au Temple; Ouvrage enrichi d'Autographes, de Portraits, et de Plans.* Par M. A. DE BEAUCHESNE. Paris: Plon frères, Editeurs. 1852. 2 vols. 8vo.

2. *Filia Dolorosa: Memoirs of* MARIE THÉRÈSE CHARLOTTE, *Duchess of Angoulême, the Last of the Dauphines.* By MRS. ROMER, Author of "A Pilgrimage to the Temples and Tombs of Egypt," etc. London: Richard Bentley. 1852. 2 vols. 8vo.

3. *An Abridged Account of the Misfortunes of the Dauphin, followed by some Documents in Support of the Facts related by the Prince; with a Supplement.* Translated from the French, by the HON. and REV. C. G. PERCIVAL, Rector of Calverton, Bucks. London: James Fraser. 1838. 8vo. pp. 714.

THE titles of these books will inevitably remind our readers of the ingenious article some time since printed in Putnam's Magazine, in support of the pretensions of the Rev. Eleazer Williams to be the veritable son of the unfortunate Louis XVI., and the present legitimate heir to the crown of France. Shortly after perusing the article in question, M. de Beauchesne's volumes reached us from Paris, and it was our intention to devote an earlier number of this Review to a thorough examination of the subject. But the announcement of a more elaborate treatise by the Rev. Mr. Hanson, the most earnest and able of Mr. Williams's advocates, was a sufficient